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SYMPOSIUM: COGNITIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
CATEGORIZATION AND IMAGINATION
IN THE MIND OF LAW
A Conference in Celebration of the Publication of
Steven L. Winter's Book,
A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life, and Mind
INTRODUCTION*
Lawrence M. Solant
This volume contains the proceedings of a Symposium
that took place at Brooklyn Law School on October 26-27, 2001,
entitled "Cognitive Legal Studies: Categorization and
Imagination in the Mind of the Law." The Symposium-the
fourth published program of Brooklyn Law School's Center for
the Study of Law, Language and Cognition'--focuses on the
ideas that Steven Winter develops in his important new book,
* @2002 Lawrence M. Solan. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1 The earlier publications have been: P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation, Mental
Models, and the Law, 65 BROOK L. REv. 67 (1999); Roundtable: The Cognitive Bases of
Gender Bias, 65 BROOK L. REv. 1037 (1999) (containing an article with that title by
Virginia Valian, and contributions by Mariane LaFrance, Marc R. Poirier and
Elizabeth M. Schneider); The Jury in the Twenty-First Century: An Interdisciplinary
Conference, 66 BROOK L. REV. 971 (2001).
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A Clearing in the Forest: Life, Law, and Mind.2 Winter's
straightforward premise is that the legal system can only
establish principles through the people who act on its behalf,
and that conventional legal argumentation makes incorrect
assumptions about how people-including, naturally, those in
the legal system-reason.
Relying on advances in cognitive science during the past
quarter century, Winter argues that reasoning is not linear
and hierarchical the way some legal writers and much legal
doctrine present it. Rather, it is imaginative, and relies heavily
on metaphorical structure and cognitive models developed from
experience. That is, we reason more from the bottom up than
from the top down. As critics since the beginning of the
twentieth century have observed, rule-like accounts of the law
work only by sweeping a great deal of indeterminacy under the
rug. However, critical movements that revel in the law's
seeming incoherence miss the fact that significant regularities
come to light once one begins to reconceptualize the law in
terms of the kind of thinking in which people really engage in
everyday life. Winter uses advances in cognitive science to do
just that.
This challenge to conventional legal thinking has
enormous ramifications for traditional legal domains including
statutory interpretation, constitutional analysis, and the
nature of common law reasoning. With depth and insight,
Winter explores each of these topics and others. It is the
breadth of this approach to legal reasoning that led to this
Symposium being named "Cognitive Legal Studies.' In fact,
anyone looking casually at the table of contents would likely
regard this volume as a collection of interesting, but seemingly
unrelated articles on various topics in legal theory.
Contributions range widely in subject matter, including the
2000 presidential election, constitutional theory, race, legal
education, law and literature, criminal law, and the process
used by judges in reasoning about controversial cases. At a
different level, however, the collection becomes entirely
2 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND
(2001).




coherent: All of the essays in this volume are about how
phenomena seemingly at odds with conventional legal
understandings become coherent in light of certain contextual
threads, often metaphorical, that run through them. Thus, the
collection itself is a metaphor for its content.
Winter's work is heavily influenced by the writings of
George Lakoff4 and Mark Johnson. In the issue's first essay,
"Law Incarnate," Professor Johnson describes how Winter's
book fits into the broader project of cognitive science in which
Lakoff, Johnson, and many others have been engaged.5 For
those who have read neither Winter's book nor the underlying
cognitive literature, it is an excellent introduction. Johnson
argues that the categories we use in everyday life are embodied
and motivated by our experience. It is only in terms of this
motivation that one can understand them at all. He then uses
these and other insights to anchor Winter's contributions to the
study of law and mind.
Frank I. Michelman gets right to the heart of the matter
in "Relative Constraint and Public Reason: What is 'The Work
We Expect of Law?'" Michelman picks up on Winter's notion of
moderate indeterminacy in law, and asks what it says about
the ability of legal institutions to do what we might expect of
them. Of course, the question immediately forces us to ask just
what it is that we might expect law to do. This, in turn, evokes
normative issues of self-governance, which are the principal
focus of Michelman's essay. Drawing on work from political
theory, jurisprudence, and Winter's approach to cognition and
law, Michelman asks whether cognitive science might have
something to say about "public reason," which is an essential
aspect of ensuring basic liberties. In so doing, he questions the
need for special "legal" institutions in light of the deeply
entrenched, socially motivated mental models that drive
positive law.
Jeremy Paul's essay, "Changing the Subject: Cognitive
Theory and the Teaching of Law," brings the cognitive
perspective to legal education. Paul is the co-author of a book
4 Especially central to Winter's work is GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND
DANGEROUS THINGS (1987). Although he was not able to contribute to this volume,
Professor Lakoff attended and spoke at the symposium.
See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999).
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that encourages a more conceptual approach to legal
education.6 The first part of the essay explores his agreements
and disagreements with Winter's approach. The second part
explores ways in which cognitive theory can form the basis for
reformation in the law school curriculum. Many problems that
lawyers face recur regardless of the doctrinal area in which the
problem arises. While law schools purport to train students to
"think like lawyers," they spend precious little time saying
anything enlightening about how lawyers think. Advances in
cognitive theory like those developed by Winter in his book can
help law teachers take more seriously the stated educational
goals. The -curriculum already has cross-doctrinal courses, such
as Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (which,
incidentally, I teach), and could do much more. Recurring
conceptual problems, like the rules versus standards issue, or
the problem of what Paul calls "two-fers" (dealing with
situations in which the law sets forth two alternative criteria,
and the individual meets neither in full, but both in large part)
can form the basis of much more legal teaching. Paul's essay
contains a number of creative ideas along these lines, with
concrete examples.
In "The Subject and Object of Law," Lawrence Joseph
also concerns himself with normative issues. Joseph looks to
poetry as the expressive form in which authors try hardest to
transcend their linguistic heritage. They are, of course, unable
to do so (poets are human too, you know), but the effort shows
a deep commitment to grappling with the most important
human experience. Joseph argues that actors in the legal
system should certainly be obliged to make serious efforts to
come to grips with legally central concepts such as "morally
just," but rarely even try. He looks to recent work of Robin
West7 to set out the problem, and to the promise of
experientially-based legal reasoning as a starting point for
seeking an answer.
Jonathan Simon, in "Governing Through Crime
Metaphors," talks about the metaphorical structure of talk
about criminal law. Politicians and judges alike consistently
6 RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE (1999). -




describe the population as a set of victims of violent criminals,
justifying an ever-escalating set of laws and harsh
punishments. Simon looks at the "war on crime" metaphor,
developed as part of President Johnson's statement issued with
his signing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968.8 Interestingly, the war metaphor, itself socially
contingent, evoked images of World War II, in which the
population was mobilized and willing to make sacrifices for the
sake of preserving important values of society. The metaphor,
for example, would have been less apt if the Viet Nam War
were the only American war in memory at the time the bill was
enacted. Simon discusses other metaphors used to describe
crime, and ends his essay with the suggestion that a
progressive political and legal agenda might begin with serious
consideration of its metaphorical foundations. He illustrates
this point with a "war on cancer" as a means of motivating
aggressive environmental policy.
D. Marvin Jones' essay, "We Must be Hunters of
Meaning': Race, Metaphor, and the Models of Steven Winter,".
explores race as an experientially-based, socially-constructed
concept. Drawing from arguments in his forthcoming book,9
Jones shows how the concept of race is built from societal
decisions intended to create a caste-based social structure. He
does this through the use of narrative, a cognitive structure
about which Winter writes at length in his book. Jones
principally uses two stories to build his point: that of an
escaped slave, Henry Bibb, and that of the film, Guess Who's
Coming to Dinner. His essay uses these narratives to argue
that not only is the notion of race socially constructed, but that
it is constructed out of contested cognitive models that help to
explain its cognitive complexity.
In "Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look
Through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology," Dan Simon reports
on empirical work that he has conducted with colleagues about
the ways in which judges come to conclusions in highly
contested cases. Simon is a law professor and psychologist, who
has been applying work in cognitive and social psychology to
8 Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 502, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
9 D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION (forthcoming 2002).
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legal settings." How is it that five justices in the majority can
adduce some thirty or fifty arguments in favor of their position,
and the dissenting four can do the same with respect to theirs,
without appearing to acknowledge, except for some nasty
quips, that there is another side to the story? That is, if, as
Winter argues, the law of the excluded middle is the source of
enormous misconception, why do judges keep returning to it in
their -arguments? To answer this question, Simon relies on
psychological literature that uses neural networks to
demonstrate the high value that people place on coherence. He
relates these findings to the themes of the Symposium, and
more broadly to issues in legal theory.
One theme running through both Winter's book and the
essays in this volume is the importance of context in legal
reasoning. It is conventional legal wisdom that the words in a
legal document, for example a statute, must derive some of
their meaning from the context in which they are used. But
Winter uses context far more broadly and far more creatively.
Legal arguments are not only expressed in words that can only
be construed with respect to context, but the words that legal
writers use necessarily reflect the ways in which they frame
the world. His analysis of the famous debate between Hart and
Fuller over the hypothetical "no vehicles in the park" ordinance
illustrates this point well. The last two essays in this volume-
the first by Peter Gabel, the second by Winter, make this point
as they illuminate aspects of the 2000 presidential election.
Peter Gabel's essay, "What It Really Means to Say 'Law
Is Politics': Political History and Legal Argument in Bush v.
Gore," sees the 2000 election as resulting from the limited set
of images and schemas used in the political arena today.
According to Gabel, the 2000 election demonstrates the final
triumph of the Reagan Revolution. The post-electoral period
provided for Gore the opportunity to rally behind the successes
of the civil rights movement in procuring for everyone the right
to vote. But instead of evoking images of Martin Luther King
Jr. calling for universal suffrage, and instead of arguing that
the refusal to count all the votes in Florida diminished the
10 See Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30
RuTGERs L.J. 1 (1998).11 WINTER, supra note 2, at 200-06.
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value of the votes of the millions of working people nationwide
who had voted for him, Gore decided to look presidential and
rally behind arguments about the rights of states to regulate
their voting scheme without interference from the federal
government. These, of course, are the arguments that have
historically been used to oppose the civil rights movement.
Gabel argues that the rhetoric of the Reagan years-family,
the evil empire, and federalism-had become Gore's rhetoric as
well, and had prevented Gore from making the arguments that
his supporters would have wanted to hear.
In the volume's last full essay, "When Self-Governance
Is a Game," Steve Winter puts his approach to legal reasoning
to work. Focusing on the 2000 election, Winter probes the
significance of the "game" metaphor that pervaded discourse
between election day and the Supreme Court's decision. The
issue is not the fact of the matter-Bush supporters said right
from the beginning that Gore was a sore sport for trying to
change the rules of the game after it was becoming clear that
he would lose if the game were played as designed. The real
question is why the game metaphor caught hold, and was so
effective a way of presenting the dispute. The stakes were high.
The use of the "game" metaphor essentially pre-empted an
alternative conceptualization of the election as a matter of
particpatory democracy. Winter explains the dominance of the
game analysis by exploring the evolution of the concept of
"games" in contemporary culture. To summarize one point that
he makes, when we adopt our everyday experience of watching
professional sports to watching a presidential election, we
become passive observers of a contest in which the pros duke it
out according to a set of rules that is both fixed and arbitrary.
This surely explains a lot.
The Symposium issue ends with Gary Minda's
Afterword, "Steve Winter's A Clearing in the Forest." In it,
Minda describes some of the major ideas in Winter's book, and
uses them to pull together many of the ideas in the
Symposium. Minda's piece succinctly announces the promise of
Cognitive Legal Studies as a means for reforming both legal
theory and legal education.
No doubt readers will find the essays in this volume
provocative, and perhaps controversial. In fact, there is not
complete consensus among the authors on significant issues.
2002]
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But the breadth of subject matter and richness of analysis
must inevitably lead one to respect the endeavor and recognize
its explanatory power. At the end of the day, the issue is really
a simple one: Won't we learn more about how law functions if
we take more seriously the ways in which its players
understand their world?
